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ABSTRACT 
The recent developments in case law concerning compensation for extinguishment and 
impairment of native title do not adequately recognise its sui generis status as a right 
existing prior to the British colonisation of Australia. Both Australian legal principles 
and jurisprudence from other common law countries such as the US and Canada suggest 
that a restrictive view limiting native title rights and interests to those practised in 
antiquity should not be taken, and strict common law principles and limitations should 
not be applied by courts in compensating native title holders. The sui generis status of 
native title presents three propositions. The first is that inalienability should be 
irrelevant to economic compensation. The second proposition is that the economic 
value of native title should almost always be equal to the value of freehold title, unless 
specifically restricted by traditional laws or customs or by interference with title prior 
to the Racial Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth). The last proposition arising from the sui 
generis nature of native title is that compensation for non-economic loss should include 
additional sums held in trust and invested for future generations. 
I INTRODUCTION 
Native title has been recognised by the Australian common law for over twenty-five 
years. When first recognised in 1992, many in the wider community voiced concerns 
that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people would swamp the courts with litigation 
seeking large amounts of compensation for loss of their traditional lands. This feared 
state of affairs did not eventuate; until recently, no court had awarded compensation for 
extinguishment or impairment of native title. 
This changed in 2016 with Griffiths v Northern Territory of Australia (No 3)1 (‘Timber 
Creek’), a case brought by the Ngaliwurru and Nungali peoples seeking compensation 
for the extinguishment and impairment of native title in their ancestral lands. Justice 
Mansfield of the Federal Court of Australia became the first judge to consider this type 
of compensation. ?????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????????????
Federal Court in Northern Territory of Australia v Griffiths2 ????? ?Timber Creek 
Appeal?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
and calculation of non-economic loss were erroneous. The Full Court (Acting Chief 
Justice North and Justices Barker and Mortimer) handed down a decision largely 
??????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????ome key areas. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
? LLB (Hons) (JCU),  
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????????? ??????????????? was appealed to the High Court and heard in September 2018. 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
the meantime, there are several issues to consider regarding the judgments in Timber 
Creek and its appeal, as well as the native title framework of legislation and judicial 
opinions that lay the foundation for these decisions.  
This paper analyses the assessment of compensation for economic and non-economic 
loss by the courts and suggests changes to the approaches of Justice Mansfield and the 
Full Court. Part III considers the background to native title compensation, covering the 
native title framework, a brief overview of previous cases that have touched on 
compensation, and a summary of Timber Creek and the Timber Creek Appeal. Part IV 
provides a comparative analysis of the conceptualisation of native title in Australia with 
???????????? ??????? ??? ??????? ???? ???????? ??????? in the United States of America and 
outline why the current conceptualisation of native title in Australia should be revisited 
by courts. Part V of the article uses the analysis from Part IV to argue that the sui generis 
nature of native title should mean that substantial changes to the ??????????????????????
compensation for economic and non-economic loss by extinguishment or impairment 
of native title should be made.  
II BACKGROUND TO COMPENSATION FOR EXTINGUISHMENT AND 
IMPAIRMENT OF NATIVE TITLE 
A The Native Title Act framework for compensation 
Native title has a long history of litigation, meaning that the legislative framework 
containing the right to compensation for extinguishment or impairment of native title 
in Australia must be understood with reference to the case law and legislation that 
preceded it. In Mabo v Queensland (No 1),3 it was held that Queensland legislation 
extinguishing native title rights held by Torres Strait Islanders, but not affecting the 
rights of non-Indigenous landholders, was inconsistent with s 10 of the Racial 
Discrimination Act 1975 (Cth), which contains the right to enjoy equality of rights 
under the law for people of all races. As Justice Brennan, Justice Toohey and Justice 
????????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????? was not extinguished 
before the Racial Discrimination Act came into force, a State law which seeks to 
?????????????????????????????4 
This decision had major ramifications for native title. Not only did it allow the eventual 
recognition of native title in Mabo v Queensland (No 2)5 ??Mabo (No 2)????it also set 
the stage to allow for compensation where there is any act extinguishing or impairing 
native title at any time later than the time the Racial Discrimination Act came into force 
on 31 October 1975.  
Given that the Commonwealth only has constitutional power to acquire property from 
???????????????????????6 it is not surprising that the statutory entitlement to compensation 
for extinguishment or impairment of native title itself that arose under the Native Title 
Act 1994 ?????? ?????? ????? ??? ???? ???????????? ??? ????? ???????7 The Act includes a 
limitation whereby total compensation payable for an act that extinguishes native title 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
3 (1988) 166 CLR 186, 218-19, 232-3. 
4 Ibid 219.  
5 (1992) 175 CLR 1. 
6 Australian Constitution s 51(xxxi). 
7 Native Title Act 1994 (Cth) s 51(1).  
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must not exceed the amount that would be payable if the act were instead a compulsory 
acquisition of a freehold estate; however, this limitation is, again, subject to the 
????????????????????????????????????????????????.8 
The party who is to pay this compensation depends on who is responsible for doing the 
act that extinguished or impaired native title. It is likely that most claims for 
compensation will lie against the State or Territory governments, given that Crown land 
is managed by them. States and Territories are liable to compensation claims under s 
20 of the Act. However, the Commonwealth, too, may be liable where an extinguishing 
or impairing act may be attributed to it.9 Finally, the Act effectively provides that the 
Commonwealth, States or Territories may legislate to pass on liability for compensation 
to providers of public infrastructure.10 New South Wales recently legislated to pass on 
this liability.11 
There are numerous other provisions relevant to compensation in the Act, but for the 
purposes of this paper, the above are sufficient to consider the problems presented by 
recent case law. 
B Compensation prior to the Timber Creek cases 
Until 2016, compensation under the Act had never been judicially considered. 
However, the issue of compensation was raised in two cases, Jango v Northern 
Territory of Australia12 ??Jango’) in 2006 and De Rose v South Australia13 ??De Rose’) 
in 2013. However, the judges were ultimately not required to consider compensation in 
either case. Jango was a claim for compensation for the extinguishment of native title 
rights and interests over the town of Yulara near Uluru. In that case, Justice Sackville 
ultimately found that the claimant group could not satisfy the threshold issue that their 
native title rights and interests over the area existed at the time that the compensation 
acts occurred; accordingly, no requirement to consider the quantum of compensation 
arose. De Rose does not assist because the parties entered into a confidential agreement 
regarding compensation, and compensation was ordered by consent.  
C The first consideration of compensation 
In Timber Creek, Justice Mansfield became the first judge in Australia to consider 
native title compensation. Finding that the claim group were entitled to compensation 
for the extinguishment or impairment of several non-exclusive native title rights and 
interests, he was required to confront the task of quantifying the compensation 
entitlement.  
Justice Mansfield determined that, as a matter of construction of the relevant sections 
of the Act, compensation should be assessed as at the date of the compensable act.14 He 
held it should be comprised of three separate components: an amount for economic loss, 
an amount for non-economic loss and interest on the amounts from the date of the 
compensable acts. While the issue of interest necessitates future academic discussion 
(indeed, the interest amounted to the largest discrete component of the compensation in 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
8 Ibid s 51A. 
9 Ibid s 17. 
10 Ibid s 24KA(6)(a)(i) and (6)(b)(i).  
11 See Crown Land Management Act 2016 (NSW) pt 8 generally and specifically s 8.12. 
12 (2006) 152 FCR 150. 
13 [2013] FCA 988. 
14 Timber Creek (2016) 337 ALR 362, 387 [121]. 
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Timber Creek),15 the interest component is outside the scope of this paper and will not 
be considered here. 
1 Compensation for economic loss 
As to economic loss, Justice Mansfield opined that the value of exclusive native title 
rights would be equal to the freehold value of land, with no reduction in value due to 
the inalienability of the land.16 This followed from his consideration of Geita Sebea v 
Territory of Papua New Guinea17 ??Geita Sebea’). Geita Sebea was a case regarding 
compensation for the compulsory acquisition of Indigenous traditional rights and 
interests of the Kila Kila people in land in the Territory of Papua (then an Australian 
territory), in which the High Court found that the inalienability of land should have no 
detrimental effect upon its value, given that the Crown would acquire an estate in fee 
simple that was freed from any such restriction.18 However, because the rights in 
question in Timber Creek were non-exclusive, and noting that, had the claim group had 
its way, it would not have surrendered the rights at all and the value of the rights to the 
Northern Territory would be close to freehold value,19 Justice Mansfield held that a 
reduction in compensation to 80% of the freehold value of the land at the time of the 
acts (totalling $512,000) was necessary in these circumstances.20 
2 Compensation for non-economic loss 
The claim group in Timber Creek sought compensation for two overlapping elements 
to non-economic or intangible loss. These were the diminution or disruption in 
traditional attachment to country and the loss of rights to live on, and gain spiritual and 
material sustenance from the land.21 Justice Mansfield found that the court should adopt 
the description ???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
element of compensation, and that in native title cases it required regard to the 
communal/collective ownership of the relevant rights and interests.22  
He admitted that the process requ????????????????????????????????????????????????????23 
He held that the proper approach was to consider only what, if any, non-economic effect 
there was upon the pre-existing native title by the compensable acts, and that acts 
adversely affecting native title prior to the compensable acts were to be taken into 
account, given that they lay outside the parameters of s 51(1) of the Act.24 
The parties accepted that non-economic loss was to be calculated on an in globo basis, 
that is, considering the overall effect on the two elements mentioned above. Justice 
Mansfield agreed that an assessment of the value of non-???????????????????????-by-
??????????????????????????????????25 He held that: 
?????? ??? ??????????? ??? ???????????? ??????? ??????? ??????? ??? ????? ????????? ??? the 
compensable acts must necessarily have caused a loss or impairment of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
15 Ibid 446 [466]. 
16 Ibid 404 [225]. 
17 (1941) 67 CLR 544. 
18 Ibid 555, 557. 
19 Timber Creek (2016) 337 ALR 362, 404?5 [232]. 
20 Ibid 405 [232]. 
21 Ibid 416 [295].  
22 Ibid 417 [300]?[301].  
23 Ibid 417 [302].  
24 Ibid 420?21 [322]?[323].  
25 Ibid 421 [324]. 
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spiritual/traditional attachment in respect of that land and in Timber Creek generally 
at the time of that loss or impairment. Any award of compensation for loss or 
spiritual attachment in respect of land affected by the compensable acts must 
properly take into account the extent to which the spiritual attachment to that land 
has already been impaired or affected by the loss or destruction of significant places 
on nearby land or in Timber Creek. In my view, it is open to the Court to infer from 
the evidence which does not specifically relate to an act or parcel of land, that a 
further sense of loss is felt in consequence of the determination acts.26 
To put it more briefly, his decision means that a court can take into account the loss of 
spiritual or traditional attachment extending beyond the boundaries of lots affected by 
compensable acts, to loss pertaining to nearby sacred places. Justice Mansfield went on 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
generations was compensable.27 
Noting that the effects of the loss had been experienced for some three decades and had 
not dissipated over time, He held that compensation should be assessed on the basis of 
the past three decades or so of the loss of cultural and spiritual relationship with the 
land, and for an extensive time into the future.28 Acknowledging that the selection of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
calculation,?29 Justice Mansfield held that the appropriate component of the solatium 
component of the compensation package should be assessed at $1.3 million.  
He did not explain the exact basis for his calculations or what percentage of the solatium 
award related to the diminution or disruption in traditional attachment to country and 
what percentage related to the loss of rights to live on and gain spiritual and material 
sustenance from the land. Nor did Justice Mansfield discuss what proportion of the 
award related to a sense of failed responsibility, and what proportion was to compensate 
past, as opposed to future, loss.  
D The Appeal 
While there were six separate issues in the appeal, this paper focuses solely on the issues 
of assessment of economic loss and calculation of non-economic loss. Note, however, 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? be assessed as at the date of 
the compensable act was not among the issues appealed. 
1 Compensation for economic loss 
In the context of considering economic loss, the Full Court held that Justice Mansfield 
had overvalued the claim g???????????????????????hts and interests by finding they were 
an impediment to any other grants of interests and were exercisable in such a way as to 
prevent further activity on the land, stating that it is necessary to compare the legal 
content of the rights rather than the way in which the rights have been exercised.30 The 
Full court also held that the primary judge erred in taking into account the value of the 
acquisition to the acquiring authority (the Northern Territory).31 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
26 Ibid 421 [326]. 
27 Ibid 432 [381]. 
28 Ibid 433 [382].  
29 Ibid 433 [383]. 
30 Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 508?9 [78]?[84]. 
31 Ibid 510?511 [89]?[92]. 
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???????????????????????????????????????????????????is dedicated to consideration of the 
effect of inalienability of native title land upon the quantum of compensation to be 
awarded. The Court was of the view that Justice Mansfield had impermissibly 
considered the unwillingness of the claim group to surrender their native title in 
determining the economic value of the land. This, the Full Court held, was a factor that 
was influenced by the claim g????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
any economic reason.32 This aspect was to be addressed in assessment of the non-
economic value of the rights and interests, rather than in an assessment of economic 
value; accordingly, the Court held that trial judge had overvalued the economic value 
of the rights and double counted the non-economic factors.33 
Continuing its consideration of the effect of inalienability, the Full Court held that, 
contrary to the approach of Justice Mansfield, it was necessary to discount the value of 
the rights and interests held by the claim group because the rights were inalienable.34 It 
held that Geita Sebea was a case specifically concerned with the construction of Papuan 
ordinances and did not alter the general principle expressed in Corrie v MacDermott35 
??Corrie?????????????????????Corrie principle ? that land is assessed at the value to the 
old owner rather than the new, and restrictions affecting the value to the old owner are 
to be taken into account in calculating compensation value ? is applicable in the context 
of native title,36 apparently despite its sui generis status.  
The Full Court?s view is that the Spencer37 test was applicable, even though the rights 
and interests were inalienable.38 The Spencer approach requires a court to quantify the 
value of land at the amount a person desiring to buy the land would have to pay for it 
to a vendor willing to sell it for a fair price but not desirous to sell.39 The Full Court 
held that to have applied the Spencer test would have reduced the economic value of 
the claim g???????????????????????????????????????????????????ily significantly.?40 
The Full Court set out an approach for the calculation of economic loss in the context 
of native title compensation comprised of the following principles:41 
1. the starting point for calculation of economic value is an analogy of exclusive native 
title with freehold title; 
2. freehold value is adjusted to account for the restrictions and limitations applicable to 
non-exclusive native title rights and a court must consider rights to use land, restrictions 
and inalienability; and 
3. no allowance is made for the attachment of the native title holders to land; this will be 
considered as part of non-economic loss. 
Ultimately, the Full Court held that the economic value of the rights and interests of the 
claim group was 65% of the value of freehold title.42 This amounted to $416,325, a 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
32 Ibid 513?14 [109]?[111]. 
33 Ibid 514 [111]. 
34 Ibid 514?15 [115]. 
35 [1914] AC 1056. 
36 Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 515?16 [117]?[119].  
37 Spencer v Commonwealth ???????????????????Spencer???? 
38 Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 516?17 [120]?[122]. 
39 Spencer (1907) 5 CLR 418, 431. 
40 Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 517 [122]. 
41 Ibid 519?22 [133]?[144]. 
42 Ibid 49[139]. 
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2 Compensation for non-economic loss 
The Full Court held that there was no error in Justice Mansfield??? ????????? ???
calculating non-economic loss and declined to exercise its discretion to fix the amount 
of the award for solatium.43 While there was no alteration to the award, some parts of 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????are important for the purposes of this 
paper.  
The Full Court held that the effect of the compensable acts on sacred places and ritual 
grounds adjacent to affected lots can be considered where the place remains important 
at the time of the compensable act.44 It also held that the in globo approach was correct 
as the evidence of the nature of the claim g??????????????????????????????????????????
for consideration of the value of non-economic loss lot-by-lot.45  
The Court confirmed that a sense of failed responsibility to protect the land can be 
compensated where the failed responsibility is unrelated to the ability to control access 
to and use of the land (which are compensable at common law and not under the Act), 
and that this was the case with the claim group.46 It then confirmed that the duration of 
the effect of the compensable acts was a proper factor for the primary judge to take into 
account.47 
Additionally??????????? ??????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????
of fairness and moderation that governs the award of solatium was found to be 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
fairness and moderation from prior case law as constituting a principle, but rather than 
such considerations provide a restraint on extravagant awards.48 It held that there was 
no requirement to have regard to any such principle in fixing the amount of solatium in 
native title.49 
Finally, the Full Court considered whether the award of solatium calculated by Justice 
Mansfield was manifestly excessive. It considered the limitations in s 51(1), 51(5) and 
(6), 51A and 53 of the Act and concluded that notwithstanding these provisions, the 
task of fixing the amount of compensation requires an exercise of discretion.50 The 
Court notes that the primary judge considered matters relevant to the assessment of 
solatium and did not make any errors in the selection or evaluation of those matters.51  
However, because the Act requires that the compensation reflect just terms (as 
discussed above), the question for the Court was whether the figure was substantially 
beyond the highest figure which could reasonably have been awarded.52 Given that 
there was no judicial consideration of compensation for extinguishment or impairment 
of native title prior to Timber Creek, the Court looked to international decisions 
awarding compensation to native title holders. The international decisions were limited 
to two Paraguayan cases heard in the Inter-American Court of Human Rights, where 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
43 Ibid 578 [420]. 
44 Ibid 553 [300].  
45 Ibid 556?7 [317]?[319]. 
46 Ibid 557?8 [323]?[326]. 
47 Ibid 559 [333]. 
48 Ibid 568 [376]. 
49 Ibid 569 [378]. 
50 Ibid 569 [379]?[380].  
51 Ibid 572?3 [394]. 
52 The court recognised this principle as enunciated in R v Williscroft, Weston, Woodley and Robinson 
[1975] VR 292. 
135
Kylie Arlidge and Gary D Meyers 
?
the claimants were awarded compensation substantially in excess of the amount 
awarded to the Ngaliwurru and Nungali people in Timber Creek.53 The Court also 
looked at a 2002 discussion paper commissioned by the Native Title Research Unit of 
the Australian Institute for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies,54 which it held 
validated the amount of the award.55 
Ultimately, the Full Court held that the figure of $1.3 million was within the permissible 
range on the evidence before Justice Mansfield and declined to alter the award for 
solatium. 
III CONCEPTUALISATION OF NATIVE TITLE: WHAT IS BEING 
COMPENSATED? 
To truly understand issues with the approach to compensation presented by the Full 
???????? reasoning in the Timber Creek Appeal, the fundamental questions of what 
native title is, what rights flow from a native title determination, and what they might 
be if they were fairly and correctly interpreted in accordance with the common law, 
must be answered. The answers given by Australian courts have largely been vague, 
unsatisfactory and confused. However, consideration of overseas authorities can 
provide some insight into the breadth of what native title could effectively entail ? 
and, potentially, identify where Australian courts have been led astray.  
A Conceptualisation in Australia 
In Australia, judicial commentary has varied as to what rights are and are not held by 
traditional owners. It is generally accepted since Mabo (No 2) that the rights of native 
title holders are the rights to use and occupy their ancestral lands, in accordance with 
their traditional laws.56  
The Act provides the following definition of native title, based on the common law 
recognition articulated in Mabo (No 2): 
The expression native title or native title rights and interests means the communal, 
group or individual rights and interests of Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait 
Islanders in relation to land or waters, where: 
(a) the rights and interests are possessed under the traditional laws acknowledged, 
and the traditional customs observed, by the Aboriginal peoples or Torres 
Strait Islanders; and 
(b) the Aboriginal peoples or Torres Strait Islanders, by those laws and customs, 
have a connection with the land or waters; and 
(c) the rights and interests are recognised by the common law of Australia.57 
However, the majority of the High Court has since held in Members of the Yorta Yorta 
Aboriginal Community v Victoria58 that native title is defined by s 223 of the Act with 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
53 See Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 573?576 [397]?[405] for discussion of the Paraguayan 
cases. 
54 ?????????????????????????????????late Native Tit???????????????????????????????aper, Australian 
Institute for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies, 2002). 
55 Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 576 [406]. 
56 See, eg, Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 51, 86, 184-8; Gary D ?????????Implementing Native Title 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????University of Tasmania 
Law Review 1, 9.  
57 Native Title Act 1993 (Cth) s 223(1). 
58 (2002) 214 CLR 422, 453 [75]. 
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reference to the traditional laws and customs of the group in question, and that native 
??????????????a creature of the common law?? The Court further held that the rights and 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
survived that fundamental change in legal regime, and now, by resort to the processes 
of the new ?????? ??????? ???? ??? ????????? ???? ???????????59 Without consideration of 
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
correct, it is convenient for the analysis in this paper to be limited to consideration of 
the intersection of the Act with traditional laws and the interpretation of native title to 
be taken from those sources.  
The definition of native title in s 223(2) of the Act goes on to state that rights and 
interests referred to in the definition of native title include hunting, gathering or fishing 
rights and interests, but the drafters have taken care to note that s 223(2) does not limit 
the primary definition. This could be taken to mean that the provision provides certainty 
that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people may have additional rights to use land 
beyond those that other Australian landholders have, where their traditional laws and 
customs allow for certain uses of the land or waters. It is for this reason that the 
approach taken by the courts appears to be confused and potentially incorrect in law. 
Since Mabo (No 2), courts have become bogged down in what appears to be an attempt 
to itemise each and every activity Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander traditional 
owners may carry out on their land by reference to traditional laws and customs, rather 
than allowing those laws and customs to simply prove the right to possess and occupy 
the land. If the latter approach was taken, traditional owners would be within their rights 
use their lands in the manner any landholder may use his or her land, other than in a 
way prohibited under traditional laws.  
A prime example of this confusing ??????????????approach can be found in the High 
Court case Western Australia v Ward60 (‘Mirriuwung Gajerrong??. The majority noted 
that the ????????????????????????????????????????????????????is useful to draw attention to 
the fact that there may be more than one right or interest, and that there may be several 
different kinds of right or interest held by a group.61 In summarising their findings, the 
majority set out a handy list of the rights considered, including: rights to control access 
to, or the use to be made of, land;62 rights to be asked permission to use or have access 
to land;63 rights to or interest in any mineral or petroleum;64 and rights to fish.65 
Pearson argues ????? ??? ??? ???? ???? ??????????????? ??????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ???
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
recognised by Australian law, but that that these idiosyncratic rights merely identify the 
right of particular Indigenous people to occupy particular territory, and to further 
identify the internal allocation of rights, interests and responsibilities.66 This position 
has some merit; the High Court itself has said that the understanding of native title is 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
59 Ibid 454 [77]. 
60 (2002) 213 CLR 1. 
61 Ibid 95. 
62 Ibid 209. 
63 Ibid 210.  
64 Ibid 212. 
65 Ibid. 
66 ??????????????????? ???? ??????? ???????????????????????-Honoured Methodology of the Common 
????? ??? ???? ??????????????? ??? ??????? ?????? ??? ??????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??????? ??????? ?????
Newcastle Law Review 1, 10. 
137
Kylie Arlidge and Gary D Meyers 
?
not stuck in 1788,67 therefore the position the Court has taken here seems limited in 
terms of the present needs of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people.  
It is difficult to understand why courts have concluded that native title should be limited 
to what is specifically included in traditional laws and customs, as opposed to allowing 
any use of the land other than those uses that are specifically excluded under traditional 
laws and customs. The latter interpretation would not fail to satisfy the definition in s 
223 nor would it be any less an authentic way to satisfy traditional laws and customs. 
Indeed, anything not expressly forbidden in Australian law is legal to do, and it would 
be absurd to expect Parliament or the courts to itemise everything that an Australian 
citizen can do. It is therefore unreasonable to expect Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander 
law to do so.  
At this point, consideration must be given to authorities from overseas jurisdictions. 
Particularly useful are judgments from countries with similar colonial histories to 
Australia, such as Canada and the United States of America, which have long 
jurisprudential histories with native title. 
B Comparison with conceptualisation in Canada 
Canada has a much longer history of court judgments regarding native title ? usually 
referred to in Canada ??????????????????????? than does Australia. The first legal decision 
recognising native title rights was St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The 
Queen68 ??St Catherine’s Milling????a case in which the Privy Council (on appeal from 
the Supreme Court of Canada) famously ??????????????????????????????????????????????
????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????69 This formulation left 
a significant degree of uncertainty at play for the Canadian Aboriginal peoples, given 
????????????????????????????????????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????
in which the British Crown acknowledged the rights of the Aboriginal people to occupy 
and use their traditional lands.70 The question of whether Aboriginal title arose only 
from the Proclamation, and not from any other source, persisted for almost a century. 
If this was the case, Australian native title, arising as it does from occupation, could 
have nothing to learn from Canadian jurisprudence. 
This question was answered in 1973 in Calder v Attorney-General of British 
Columbia71 ??Calder??, in which the Canadian Supreme Court held that the source of 
Aboriginal title was simply the occupancy of traditional lands prior to British 
settlement.72 This case and its ongoing acceptance shows that Canadian jurisprudence 
can be used as a tool to analyse its Australia counterparts, given that it shows that 
Aboriginal title, like native title in Australia, arises from occupation of the land and not 
from any treaty, proclamation or other instrument. However, unfortunately for the 
native applicants in the Canadian case, the Court went on to find that the British 
sovereign had extinguished Aboriginal title by opening the land for settlement.73 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
67 Mabo (No 2) (1992) 175 CLR 1, 61-2. 
68 St Catherine’s Milling and Lumber Company v The Queen (1888) 14 App Cas 46.  
69 Ibid 54. 
70 Garth Nettheim, Gary D Meyers and Donna Craig, Indigenous Peoples and Governance Structures: A 
Comparative Analysis of Land and Resource Management Rights (Aboriginal Studies Press, 2002) 79, 
81, 85. 
71 (1973) 34 DLR (3d) 145.  
72 Ibid 156.  
73 Ibid 167; Nettheim, Meyers and Craig, above n 70, 110 n 53. 
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Some Canadian cases have been decided on issues relevant only to lands under treaty.74 
However, as is seen in Calder, treaties are not a source nor basis for Aboriginal title in 
Canada; treaties merely alter the original rights to land by agreement, in exchange for 
other rights. Cases relevant to the content of Aboriginal title arising from the occupancy 
???? ???? ??? ????? ??? ????????? ??tive people can therefore cast light on Australian 
jurisprudence as to the content and conceptualisation of native title, ignoring the effects 
of any treaty on those rights.  
It is convenient to move past older cases relevant to the content of Aboriginal title in 
Canada75 to the pre-eminent case of Delgamuukw v British Columbia76 
??Delgamuukw???? ?????? ?????? ?? ??????? ???? ?????? ??????????? ??? ??????????? ?????? ???
Canada. Delgamuukw affirmed the sui generis nature of Canadian Aboriginal title, 
stating that it is sui generis ???????????????????????????????????before the assertion of 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????.77 
Chief Justice Lamer laid out the definition of Aboriginal title: 
Aboriginal title is a right in land and, as such, is more than the b right to engage in 
specific activities which may be themselves aboriginal rights. Rather, it confers the 
right to use land for a variety of activities, not all of which need be aspects of 
practices, customs and traditions which are integral to the distinctive cultures of 
aboriginal societies. Those activities do not constitute the right per se; rather, they 
are parasitic on the underlying title. However, that range of uses is subject to the 
limitation that they must not be irreconcilable with the nature of the attachment to 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????78 
The Court did accept in Delgamuukw, as it had in previous cases, that the land was 
alienable only to the Crown, but it went on to clarify that this does not mean Aboriginal 
title is merely a personal right. The Court stated that inalienability ????????????????????
aboriginal title is a non-proprietary interest which amounts to no more than a licence to 
use and occupy the land and cannot compete on equal footing with other proprietary 
interests.?79 The reasoning for inalienability in Canada is similar to that in Australia, 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ?????
is enjoyed by the community with aboriginal title to it. The community cannot put the 
?????????????????????????????????????????????80 
The Delgamuukw definition, should something similar be accepted in Australia, would 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
activities specifically identified in traditional laws and customs or oral histories should 
be performed on native title land. It would provide Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander 
native title holders with the freedom to fairly and equally, in line with the rights granted 
to non-Indigenous Australians, utilise their lands for whatever purposes they see fit, as 
long as the activity is not destructive to their connection to land.  
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
74 See, eg, Guerin v the Queen [1984] 2 SCR 335, which confirmed at 375-6 that the Crown is a fiduciary 
of Aboriginal lands due to its supervisory role adopted under treaty. 
75 See, eg, Sparrow v the Queen (1990) 3 CNLR 160, regarding fishing rights; R v Van der Peet (1996) 
137 DLR (4th) 289, which held at 310 ????? ???? ?????????????? ??? ??? ??????????? ?? ?????????? ??????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????
right.  
76 [1997] 3 SCR 1010.  
77 Ibid 1082 [114].  
78 Ibid 1080 [111]. 
79 Ibid 1081?2 [113]?[113]. 
80 Ibid 1090 [129] 
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As Chief Justice Lamer said in Delgamuukw??????????????????????????????????????????????
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ? ???????????????
a legal straitjacket on aboriginal peoples who have a legitimate legal claim to the 
??????81 To conceptualise Australian native title as per the Canadian definition would 
give Indigenous people and bodies corporate the right to self-determination and self-
reliance within the boundaries of Australian law. Of course, limitations that are applied 
equally to other Australians ? such as restrictions on mineral exploration and the 
requirement for permits for certain activities ? could fairly be applied to native title land 
in ways that are not discriminatory against Indigenous people and do not breach the 
Racial Discrimination Act.  
Another reason recommending the Canadian formulation is to avoid necessitating 
voluminous anthropological evidence outlining each discrete activity traditionally 
performed on the land so as to itemise specific native title rights and interests. An 
acceptance that native title in Australia is a proprietary right under which land is able 
to be used for a variety of activities, not all of which need to be specifically outlined 
under traditional laws and customs, and which arises from the historic occupation of 
the land by the group in question, would not only be fair and non-discriminatory to 
Indigenous people, but efficient and less expensive for the courts and parties. 
C Comparison with conceptualisation in the United States 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????) is a long and 
fraught one, and an in-depth examination of the US jurisprudence is beyond the scope 
of this paper. For present purposes, two initial facts are important. The first is that 
Indian title has been recognised by US Courts.82 The second is that tribes have the right 
to use and occupy land until surrendered or extinguished by the sovereign83 (meaning 
the lands are inalienable to anyone except the sovereign). 
Much of the land that would have been held under Indian title by Native Americans has 
been surrendered under treaty (often procured by means of fraud, coercion, bribery and 
threats).84 Even more Indian title has been extinguished according to US state and 
federal government legislation and policy,85 with many Native Americans over the 
centuries having been moved onto reservations, sometimes far from their ancestral 
territories.  
However, where the groups do hold Indian title to land that has not been surrendered 
or extinguished, they hold it under a right that is inherent and which has existed from 
?????????????????.86 It is clear that treaties are not the source of Indian title; instead, 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
81 Ibid 1091 [132]. 
82 See, eg, Johnson and Graham's Lessee v M'Intosh 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823) ??Johnson v M’Intosh’); 
Worcester v Georgia 31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832), 561-63. 
83 Johnson v M’Intosh 21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823), 574; Gary D Meyers, ?????????????????????????????
????????????????????????? ??? ??????????????? ??????????????????? ??? ?????????????????? ????????????
(1991) 10(1) UCLA Journal of Environmental Law and Policy 67, 71. 
84 Nettheim, Meyers and Craig, above n 70, 28. 
85 See generally Stuart Banner, How the Indians Lost Their Land: Law and Power on the Frontier 
(Harvard University Press, first published 2005, 2009 ed).  
86 United States v Adair 723 F 2d 1394 (1983), 1399; ???????????????????????????????????????????????
???? ???? ????????????? ?????????? ???? ?????? ??? ???????? ??????????? ???? ????????????? ??????? ??????
Washington Law Review 1, 21-2.  
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treaties typically impose restrictions in the exercise of some rights while reserving 
existing rights.87 
The ability of Native American groups to self-govern subject only to the sovereignty of 
the US is recognised.88 The concept of inherent sovereignty arose from a trilogy of 
cases in the US Supreme Court headed by Chief Justice John Marshall.89 The trilogy 
means that tribes are not independent foreign nations, but are, as Gould summarises: 
?????????????????????????????????? ?????? ?????????? ?????? ?????? ??????????? ??? ????
"ultimate domain" of the federal government; they may not form treaties with foreign 
nations, but may govern their affairs without interference from the states, except 
when limited by treaties or by the acts of Congress.  
Implicit in the Marshall trilogy is that sovereignty exists over territory (references 
omitted).90 
The US formulation of rights attaching to Indian title land thus goes far beyond the 
rights thought to be held by Australian native title holders. The scope of this paper does 
not extend to an argument that Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people should have 
sovereignty over their traditional lands (though such an argument could undoubtedly 
be made). Rather, the US example is included simply to show the extent of freedom 
with which Native American groups may use their land under Indian title.  
There are no limitations on the use to which their land may be put, other than that they 
are inalienable to anyone other than the sovereign. There are certainly no requirements 
that tribes must only use the land for activities that were carried out under their 
historical laws and customs.  
Like the position in Canada regarding Aboriginal title, the position taken with respect 
to Indian title in the US should be carefully considered by Australian courts. While 
some Australian judges have erroneously held that US precedents are inapplicable 
because the relevant rights arise from treaties,91 the analysis above shows that this is 
not the case: treaties or treaty substitutes such as negotiated agreements/co-
management regimes, proclamations or even constitutional provisions are not the 
source of native title in the US or Canada (or New Zealand).92 The North American 
cases, in particular, can therefore be helpful when considering the content of Australian 
native title. While the current conceptualisation of Australian Indigenous rights is 
unlikely to extend to tribal sovereignty, there is no reason under either the Native Title 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
87 Nettheim, Meyers and Craig, above n 70, 171. 
88 Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831), 16.  
89 Johnson v M’Intosh21 US (8 Wheat) 543 (1823); Cherokee Nation v Georgia 30 US (5 Pet) 1 (1831); 
Worcester v Georgia31 US (6 Pet) 515 (1832)?? ???? ???????????? ???? ?? ?????? ??????? ????? ????????
Paradigm: Tribal Sovereignty at the Millenniu????????????????Columbia Law Review 809. 
90 ???????? ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????? ????????????????????????Columbia 
Law Review 809, 817. 
91 See, eg, Western Australia v Ward (2002) 213 CLR 1, 273[639] (Callinan J). 
92 See Charles F Wilkinson, American Indians, Time and the Law 15 (Yale University Press 1987); US 
v Winans 198 US 371 (1905), 381; and Washington v Washington State Commercial Fishing Vessel Ass’n 
443 US 658 (1979), 678. In Sparrow, above n 75, the Court is clear that ??????????????????????????????s 35 
means those Aboriginal and treaty rights in existence when the Constitution Act 1982 (Can) came into 
effect, that is, those rights which though they may not have been exercised, were not extinguished at the 
time of the Constitutional amendments. For a similar interpretation of the Treaty of Waitangi, see 
Michael C Blumm?? ?Native Fishing Rights and Environmental Protection in North America and New 
Zealand: A Comparative Analysis of Profits A Prendre and Habitat Servi??????? (1989) 8 Wisconsin 
International Law Journal 1, 30. 
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Act or the common law of Australia that native title holders should not, on their land, 
held under sui generis title, exercise all rights available to other Australians who hold 
freehold title to land.  
IV FUTURE JURISPRUDENCE AND DESIRABLE OUTCOMES IN 
CONCEPTUALISATION AND COMPENSATION 
The analysis of the concept of native title undertaken in Part IV of this paper leads to 
several conclusions, which themselves lead to envisioning a number of steps that may 
be taken to provide legally correct and more just outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres 
Strait Islander people when compensating them for extinguishment or impairment of 
native title. The suggested outcomes for calculation of economic and non-economic 
loss will be considered separately. 
A Compensation for economic loss 
The relevant concepts to be considered in view of compensation for economic loss are 
the relevance of inalienability to compensation given the sui generis nature of native 
title and the calculation of the value of native title rights given the conceptualisation 
analysis undertaken above. 
1 Sui generis title and inalienability 
If it is accepted that native title in Australia is sui generis, and not a creature of the 
common law, problems with the reduction of compensation for inalienability by the 
Full Court in the Timber Creek Appeal immediately become apparent. The Full Court 
did not adequately explain why the existing common law framework (as outlined in 
Corrie and Spencer) should be applicable to sui generis title, but they confirmed that it 
is. As discussed above, the Court did, however, state that Geita Sebea was not relevant 
to its analysis given it concerned Papuan ordinances.  
These two views of the Full Court appear to be contradictory. It seems illogical to state 
that Australian common law should apply to sui generis title existing prior to 
colonisation, but that consideration of Papuan law (legislative or otherwise) is clearly 
inapplicable. The two types of law are equally inapplicable to native title. Although it 
???????????????????????????????????Geita Sebea is distinguishable is correct, given that 
the reasoning of the High Court in deciding inalienability did not reduce the land value 
relied upon interpretation of specific ordinances,93 this is no reason to conclude that 
Corrie and Spencer must apply instead.  
 The better view to take is simple ? sui generis title is sui generis and nothing else. 
Common law property concepts should have no bearing on native title. A logical 
analysis of existing native title law must be undertaken outside these concepts. The first 
step in the analysis is that, since native title land is not alienable to anyone other than 
the Crown, extinguishment or impairment of native title is not by choice of the 
traditional owners in the absence of an agreement with the Crown. Given the 
Constitutional and legislative ???????????????? ?????? ???????????????????, it does not 
seem that terms reducing the value of land of people who did not want to alienate it, for 
the reason that it is inalienable??????????????????. For these reasons, inalienability should 
not be taken into account in calculating the value of economic loss for extinguishment 
or impairment of native title. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
93 Geita Sebea (1941) 67 CLR 544, 557. 
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2 The value of native title rights for calculation of economic loss 
As discussed in Part IV, it arguably makes little sense to define the scope of native title 
by reference to idiosyncratic rights specifically permitted under traditional laws and 
???????????????????????????????????????????????. Native title in Australia, in line with 
other international common law jurisdictions, should be conceptualised as equal to the 
rights held by owners of freehold, subject to cultural laws and traditions specifically 
prohibiting ??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????  
If a prohibitive view of native title is adopted?? ???? ????? ???????? ?????????? ????? ????
calculation of compensation should start at freehold value for exclusive native title and 
be reduced in line with the limitations applicable to non-exclusive native title should be 
revisited. While not exactly incorrect ???????????????????????????????????????????????????
judgment in this respect has the potential to lead future courts considering 
compensation astray. In a prohibitive view of native title, there will be no enumeration 
of rights by which the value of the land to the traditional owners may be calculated, 
meaning that native title rights that have not been impaired prior to the Racial 
Discrimination Act coming into force will always be valued as equal to freehold title 
except where there is a specific prohibition on the use of the land that would impact the 
price of freehold land with a similar restriction.  
However, the issue of non-exclusive native title would still arise under the prohibitive 
view, given that impairment of native title may indeed have occurred prior to the Racial 
Discrimination Act. In this circumstance, the reduction in value would in law still need 
to be considered, but it should not include any reference to the rights permitted to be 
practised by the Aboriginal or Torres Strait Islander traditional owners. Rather, the 
reduction in value of the land should be calculated by reference to the level of 
imposition on the freehold-level rights of the traditional owners that is presented by the 
use of the land permitted by non-traditional owners.  
An analogy with easements or profits à prendre may be helpful here. When a property 
with an easement or profit à prendre attached is sold, the buyer may seek a reduction in 
price to reflect the inconvenience or loss incurred by the interest granted to someone 
else. Courts could potentially take this approach when valuing non-exclusive native 
title. No reduction in value would be made by considering enumerated rights of the 
traditional owners (except where there is a specific traditional prohibition), but a 
reduction in value could be made for the fact that government or lessors have used or 
will use the land, affecting the ability of the traditional owners to exercise their 
????????????????????????????? 
3 Suggested approach to valuing economic loss 
It is suggested that in valuing native title under a prohibitive view, and in recognition 
of the sui generis nature of native title, courts should take the following approach to 
calculating compensation for economic loss (altering the approach taken by the Full 
Court in the Timber Creek Appeal): 
1. the starting point for calculation of economic value is an analogy of exclusive native 
title with freehold title; 
2. freehold value is reduced if traditional laws and customs prohibit a specific use of the 
land, and if prohibition of that use of the land would reduce the freehold value of the 
same land; 
3. freehold value is also adjusted to account for the inconvenience caused by use of the 
land by non-traditional owners in cases where native title rights are non-exclusive; 
4. no reduction is made in value for inalienability; and 
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5. no allowance is made for the attachment of the native title holders to land, which will 
be considered as part of non-economic loss. 
B Compensation for non-economic loss for future generations 
The approach that Justice Mansfield and the Full Court have taken to quantifying non-
economic loss seems to be sound in all the aspects that were considered. The concept 
of solatium, though a common law property concept, appears apt in its application to 
native title, despite the sui generis nature of the latter. Additionally, the monetary value 
attached to non-economic loss was in line with international cases considered by the 
Full Court.94  
However, there was an absence of compensation in both courts for the impact on future 
generations. Although Justice Mansfield acknowledges that the loss would be felt for 
an extensive time into the future,95 there was no suggestion that future generations 
should receive payments, despite suffering similar loss and pain. The sui generis nature 
of native title means it would be open to courts to order that future generations be 
compensated, despite it not being a part of Australian law regarding solatium.  
Burke, in his discussion paper considered by the Full Court, argues that compensation 
???????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????-risk investments, 
reproduce the original amount of compensation for the children in the native title group 
???????????????????????????????????????96 ??????????????????????????????? This section 
of the paper was not referred to by the Full Court in its judgment. It is not clear why 
this was not addressed, and perhaps such an outcome was not sought by the claim group. 
????????? ???????????? ???? ?????????? ??? ?????? ?????? compensation for non-economic 
loss, the failure of Justice Mansfield and the Full Court to consider compensation for 
future generations seems to leave the analysis incomplete.  
???????????????????????????????? on its face. However, if accepted as a component of 
compensation for non-economic loss, his suggestion would present a problem for the 
courts. The payment of a future generations sum without directions that it be carefully 
invested and distributed equally for future generations means there are no checks and 
balances guaranteeing that the funds will be competently managed and available for the 
compensatory purpose they were intended. On the other hand, a court giving strict 
directions on how such funds are to be held and invested reeks of past injustices 
whereby Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders were stripped of agency and their rights 
to self-determination by paternalistic legislation and the common law alike.  
Although not ideal, a middle ground can be established between these two extremes. It 
i??????????????????????????????????????????? ???????????????????????????????????????????
that the court give additional directions that it be held in trust to be invested by trustees 
elected from within the traditional owners. No directions as to the nature of investments 
should be given, but the sum should include an amount that the trustees may access 
solely for the purpose of seeking independent legal and financial advice as to the 
investments. This approach allows traditional owners to retain their agency but also 
ensures that funds are not whittled away by mismanagement, given that the trustees will 
be bound by fiduciary duties to safeguard the trust property for future beneficiaries. 
?????????????????????????????????????????????????????
94 Timber Creek Appeal (2017) 256 FCR 478, 573?576 [397]?[405]. 
95 Timber Creek (2016) 337 ALR 362, 433 [382]. 
96 Paul Burke, above n 54, 38. 
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V CONCLUSION 
This paper has summarised the current law relating to compensation for extinguishment 
??? ??????????? ??? ??????? ?????? ???? ?????????? ???????????? ???????? ??? ???? ????????
approaches to assessment of economic and non-economic loss. As title that is sui 
generis, native title compensation should not be constrained by common law principles 
relating to other kinds of property but should instead be governed by the cultural laws 
and customs of traditional owners, accepted common law principles of native title and 
the Native Title Act. The High Court in considering the appeal from the decision of the 
Full Federal Court in the Timber Creek Appeal should make substantial changes to the 
present judicial approach to compensation for the impairment or extinguishment of 
native title.  
In calculating economic loss, no reduction should be made for inalienability, reflecting 
the legislative and Constitutional requirements ??????????????????????????????????????
that was not freely sold to the Crown. Additionally, a prohibitive view of native title ? 
where the content of native title rights and interests, and thus their value, are 
circumscribed only by what was specifically prohibited under traditional laws and 
customs ? should be preferred to a permissive view under which the rights and interests 
are only those specifically allowed under traditional laws and customs. This means that 
the value of native title should always be taken to be the value of freehold land, unless 
traditional laws and customs prohibit a use that would reduce the value of land in the 
hands of another, or unless the native title has been impaired and become non-exclusive 
prior to the Racial Discrimination Act coming into force. A suggested approach to 
calculating economic loss is set out in Part V of this paper.  
As to compensating non-economic loss for extinguishment or impairment of native 
title, while the approaches of Justice Mansfield and the Full Court are largely 
??????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????????sui 
generis status means that such compensation could be ordered, despite it not being 
ordered in cases of solatium more generally. A suggested approach is for courts to order 
additional sums be held in trust and invested for future generations by trustees elected 
from within the traditional owner group.  
Further research and analysis should be done on compensation for extinguishment or 
impairment of native title, particularly once the judgment of the High Court is handed 
down. Additionally, the possibility of non-monetary compensation, which was not 
sought by the claim group in the Timber Creek cases and has therefore been outside the 
scope of this paper, should be considered. 
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